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States of Fragility: Stabilisation and Its Implications for Humanitarian Action

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Affiliation

Humanitarian Policy Group (Collinson, Elhawary); Small Arms Survey (Muggah)

Date
Summary

"Humanitarian agencies have so far tended to focus on the military aspects of stabilisation. Yet often the most significant opportunities, risks, threats and failures associated with stabilisation are political in nature. Identifying precisely how the security and wider stabilisation agenda is defined by the most powerful actors' core political and security objectives, how local and national actors and beneficiaries respond and the extent to which these accord or not with primary humanitarian priorities is key..."

Drawing on a series of background case studies conducted in 2009 and 2010, this Working Paper from the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the United Kingdom (UK)-based Overseas Development Institute (ODI) explores some of the "stabilisation" strategies being pursued in so-called "fragile states" and their implications for relief and development agencies and broader humanitarian outcomes. The paper highlights the evolution and content of "stabilisation" as a discourse and set of policies, and the challenges of translating these into practice.

"As a broader, transformative project, enhancing stability depends on pursuing a number of key parallel and connected goals, including creating a safe and secure environment, establishing the rule of law, achieving stable (or at least good enough) governance and a viable market economy and promoting social and psychological well-being." As noted here, the fusion of security and development is reflected in a host of manuals and guidelines, including the United States Institute of Peace's Guiding Principles for Stabilisation and Reconstruction. Despite these efforts to clarify communication around what is meant by "stabilisation", the authors argue that the core objectives of stabilisation and the ways and means by which these objectives might be achieved remain deeply controversial, reflecting the competing mandates, priorities, interests, and capacities of the many different actors involved. They explain that, "Stabilisation has varied guises in different contexts, involving different combinations of military, political, development and humanitarian resources and action, and pursued with more or less conservative or transformative aims and varying levels of financial and human investment and levels of 'success'."

The next section of the paper argues that weaknesses in the evidence-base for many stabilisation strategies are compounded by weaknesses in human resourcing and communication, particularly with regard to the provision of expert knowledge and analysis of the political, social, and economic context in which stability operations are taking place. In Helmand Province in Afghanistan, for example, the UK has sought to stimulate political engagement between local residents and their provincial leaders. However, "weak gubernatorial leadership between 2006 and 2008, shortages of UK civilian personnel and the rapid six-monthly rotation of both military and civilian elements meant that stabilisation planners lacked a sufficiently detailed knowledge of Helmand's political and tribal forces. For at least the first two years of British involvement, this militated against the development and implementation of a detailed path to stability and an understanding of what support was necessary to legitimise the Helmand authorities."

The section titled "Humanitarianism and Stabilisation: Uneasy Bedfellows" highlights recent debates that have encouraged a more broadly defined humanitarianism that seeks to address the causes or reduce the risks of suffering and disaster among vulnerable populations by fostering engagement in comprehensive peace-building and post-conflict activities. As reported here, many agencies have accepted the challenge of attempting to engineer and transform societies, and humanitarian actors have also increasingly advocated for states to take responsibility for protecting civilians during conflict. The authors point out that this more ambitious humanitarianism has significant overlaps with the "softer" end of stabilisation, but any effective partnership or engagement will depend on the extent to which stabilisation achieves the objectives it sets out. As the authors note, "humanitarian actors will remain extremely wary of tying themselves to an apparently faltering policy whose numerous and often undeclared or ill-defined objectives they distrust."

One communication-related recommendation to emerge is that humanitarian actors need to look beyond the rhetoric to understand the nature of particular stabilisation campaigns. "The level and nature of the political and strategic ambition among key international and national actors will prove crucial in all respects, including for humanitarian actors and humanitarian space."

Source

ODI website, June 16 2010.